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"Promotion as a reward in the military hierarchy: perception and reality"

As part of a masters degree in Human Resource Management in 2002, I completed a dissertation that explored the concept of promotion through the military rank structure as a reward mechanism. A summary of the dissertation is reproduced below. The full dissertation can be downloaded in pdf format.

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Promotion as a reward in the military hierarchy: perception and reality

Executive Summary

Organizations use rewards first to compensate employees for turning up and giving an adequate level of performance and then to motivate employees to 'extra effort' behaviour where they exceed expectations in the furtherance of the organizational goals¹. In the highly structured internal labour market of the military, benefits and financial remuneration are fixed and equitable for each rank in the hierarchy. Promotion is thus the only means to greater levels of financial reward, be it through progression to a higher pay scale or entitlement to higher pension benefits. Promotion may also be a visible sign of non-financial rewards; for an individual it may be viewed as sign of achievement, it can be a recognition by the organization that an individual is capable of taking on a more responsible role, and it is also a highly visible sign of increased status within the organization. The purpose of the research was to establish the value that individuals placed on promotion as a reward and the organizational policy on the purpose of the promotion system. Using academic theory from reward and motivational literature, the research was conducted using a postal survey of 400 Royal Air Force officers and interviews with senior personnel management staff.

Command decisions at the top of the military hierarchy have a multiplicative effect on the organization's output as these decisions are translated into action further down the hierarchy². The military therefore need to have the most talented individuals in the high-ranking positions, and the selection criteria used to appoint personnel become more critical the higher the position. These selection criteria affect the organization as they signal the types of behaviour personnel need to exhibit to be selected, although some of these behaviours may not be beneficial to the organization³.

Due to the high skill specificity of the military environment - the skills required can only be gained through training - a person's ability and experience to fit them for higher command is revealed only slowly over time. Their potential for higher positions only becomes known after a series of 'trials', once their performance in a variety of appointments has been recorded. Only those personnel with sufficient potential are allowed to continue up the command chain. Promotion operates much like a 'tournament' or elimination competition - only certain numbers from within an eligible group of personnel are selected for the higher rank positions, with the unsuccessful personnel 'passed over'. In tournaments relative performance rather than absolute performance is the key - the winner does not have to achieve a set standard, they just have to be better than the other competitors³.

The incentive effect of promotion for those in lower ranks thus depends on the structure of rewards and compensation at the higher ranks, and is maintained throughout the promotion hierarchy as winning at one level does not bring assurance of winning at the next level. Personnel must maintain their efforts and demonstrate sufficient ability and potential relative to their competitors if they wish to remain in the tournament for the subsequent ranks. There is also some degree of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Early winners of promotion can be seen as high-fliers, and are thus given more opportunities to develop, whilst 'losers' are denied chances to prove themselves, being stuck within 'undemanding' roles⁴.

Promotion is valued as a reward by servicemen, particularly for the new challenges and greater responsibility the new rank will bring, together with the increased financial benefits, and is perceived by service personnel as the reward for 'extra-effort' performance. However, a variety of external factors are also seen to act on an individual's prospects within the promotion tournament, the most significant being the appraisal writing skills of reporting officers.

The purpose of the promotion system though is to select appropriate personnel for command and other positions of responsibility. Promotion is not given as a reward for performance, although good performance is a pre-requisite for promotion. The command and branch structure determines the number of available positions, and the prospects of promotion are not equal across the ground branches. The tournament nature of the promotion system benefits the Royal Air Force as it allows the selection of the most able individuals to higher positions at minimal marginal cost. However, in a tournament, rewards are used as the incentive for competition. They are not given to reward current job performance. Promotion is thus the reward for winning the tournament and performing better than other competitors, it is not a reward for performing above expectation.

Whilst there is a mis-match between the Royal Air Force policy and the perceptions of individuals about promotion as a reward, and the prospects of promotion are affected by branch structures and other external factors, the lack of dissonance actions by individuals - i.e. they could either reduce their efforts or leave - means the mis-match is not having a detrimental effect on the organization. This lack of dissonance action is explained by tournament theory, as individuals cannot afford to reduce their efforts or they will lose ground in the competition.

¹ Steers, R. M. and Porter, L. W. (1991) Motivation and Work Behavior. (5th edition). New York: McGraw-Hill.
² Rosen, S. (1992) 'The military as an internal labor market: some allocation, productivity, and incentive problems', Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 73, No. 2, pp. 227-238.
³ Kerr, S. (1975) 'On the folly of rewarding A while hoping for B', Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 18, No.4, pp 769-783.
⁴ Rosenbaum, J. E. (1979) 'Tournament mobility: career patterns in a corporation', Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol 24, No. 2, pp. 220-241.

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